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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007). 
 
I am a descendant of property outlaws.  In 1856, my great-great-
great grandfather Robert Fowler, an English immigrant, moved his 
family to the Cherokee Neutral Lands in the southeastern corner of 
the Kansas Territory.  As the appellation suggests, however, Grandpa 
Bob was not supposed to be there.  The Neutral Lands—a twenty-five-
mile-wide strip of land extending along fifty miles of the Missouri 
border north of the Oklahoma-Kansas state line—were established as 
a buffer zone between white settlers and Native Americans in an 1825 
treaty with the Osage; the treaty prohibited all settlement in the area.  
A decade later, another treaty conveyed the Neutral Lands to the 
Cherokee Nation, again on the condition that it remain people-free.
1
  
This prohibition did not deter as many as three thousand white set-
tlers from moving there in the decade leading up to the Civil War.  In 
1860, the federal government undertook to remove them.  Moving 
north, soldiers burned farms and evicted families,
2
 stopping for the 
winter less than a mile from the Fowler settlement.  Luckily (for 
Grandpa Bob), the Civil War intervened, and the soldiers were re-
called from their eviction duties to fight more important battles.  Dur-
ing the war, another group of property outlaws—this time a band of 
Confederate-sympathizing Missouri Bushwhackers and their Cherokee 
allies—also sought to evict the settlers from the Neutral Lands.  Over 
the course of a month, the pillaging band drove more than sixty fami-
lies from their homes before Union troops killed their ringleader, an 
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unsavory character named John Matthews.
3
  Again, Robert Fowler 
emerged unscathed (although family lore has it that he sent his family 
to hide in a nearby creek bed). 
My renegade roots don’t end there.  At the end of the Civil War, 
the Cherokees ceded title to the Neutral Lands “in trust” back to the 
United States.  Soon thereafter, Secretary of the Interior Orville H. 
Browning sold the land to his brother-in-law, railroad baron James Joy, 
for $1 per acre.
4
  Outraged by the sale, the settlers quickly organized a 
vigilante organization known as the “Cherokee Neutral Land League.”  
The League had two purposes:  to promote the settlers’ interests in 
Washington, D.C., and to engage in violent self-help measures closer 
to home.  In furtherance of these goals, the Land League established 
a “death line” along the Neutral Lands’ northern border, threatening 
to hang any railroad employee attempting to survey below it;
5
 raided 
railroad offices, attacked construction crews, and burned the head-
quarters of a pro-Joy newspaper; and used various tactics—including, 
in at least two cases, murder—to dissuade settlers from purchasing 
their claims from Joy.
6
  (My father assures me that Robert Fowler par-
ticipated in League activities; I am afraid to ask which ones.)  Federal 
soldiers again intervened, this time to protect the railroad’s interests.
7
  
Throughout the dispute, the settlers asserted their right to acquire the 
property directly from the federal government under the terms of the 
Homestead Act.  Eventually, those who arrived prior to 1866 were 
permitted to purchase the property from the government, although at 
the appraised value rather than the usual $1.25 per acre.
8
  In 1870, 
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Robert Fowler’s son, George, purchased 160 acres from the federal 
government for $500.
9
 
My family’s story will be familiar to those who have read Eduardo 
Peñalver and Sonia Katyal’s engaging article, Property Outlaws.
10
  
Robert Fowler was, according to their taxonomy, an “[a]cquisitive out-
law[]”:
11
  he was a trespasser whose actions were “oriented primarily 
toward direct appropriation.”
12
  Peñalver and Katyal contrast the self-
interested acquisitive outlaw with the other-regarding “[e]xpressive out-
law[],” who trespasses as a form of conscientious objection, and the 
“intersectional outlaw[],” whose actions commingle acquisitive and ex-
pressive elements.
13
  According to Peñalver and Katyal, property out-
laws are underappreciated because, in appropriate circumstances, 
they serve both “redistributive” and “informational” functions.
14
  That 
is, property outlaws both catalyze “efficient or justified forced transfers 
of entitlements” and “draw[] attention to the need for reform.”
15
  My 
reflection on Property Outlaws focuses on two of the article’s animating 
assumptions about property and property laws.  Most of my Response 
challenges Peñalver and Katyal’s repeated assertion that acquisitive 
outlaws serve a valuable destabilizing function.  The closing paragraphs 
of my Response question their characterization of trespass as a rela-
tively harmless form of conscientious objection. 
Throughout their article, Peñalver and Katyal express concern 
that property law’s inherent conservatism and preference for stability 
causes it to have “a greater tendency than many other areas of law to 
become ossified and out of date.”
16
  They reason that acquisitive, and 
perhaps also intersectional, outlaws serve a necessary destabilizing 
function, providing occasional “‘shocks’ to the system” that, in the 
end, promote a new, more just equilibrium.
17
  My intuition, however, 
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is the opposite of Peñalver and Katyal’s:  it strikes me that acquisitive 
outlaws usually respond to instability in a property regime, not the ossi-
fied hyper-stability that Peñalver and Katyal fear.  Thus, while Peñalver 
and Katyal are correct that acquisitive outlaws sometimes prompt an 
efficient evolution of property rules, I suspect that the evolutionary 
sequence generally proceeds from instability to stability, not from bad 
stability to instability to good stability as they suggest. 
Consider Robert Fowler.  There was nothing stable about the 
property rules governing the Cherokee Neutral Lands in 1856.  Over 
the thirty preceding years, the U.S. government had signed treaties 
with two different tribes regarding the territory, both times stipulating 
that it remain essentially empty.
18
  It was clear, at least from the time 
that the Kansas Territory was opened to settlement on May 30, 1854, 
that this was a holding pattern—not a stable equilibrium.
19
  Eventually, 
any reasonably informed observer could have concluded that the Neu-
tral Lands would be settled.  The only questions were how and by 
whom, although history strongly suggested that it would be by white 
settlers, not Native Americans.  In other words, squatters like Robert 
Fowler did not destabilize a settled property regime, but rather sought 
to position themselves as protected rights-holders when the regime ul-
timately stabilized.
20
  For this reason, I question Peñalver and Katyal’s 
assertion that the squatters believed that “federal land policy was pat-
ently unfair and unworthy of obedience.”
21
  It would be more accurate 
to say that the squatters believed that one possible resolution of the 
uncertainty—the sale of federal lands to speculators, rather than its 
direct transfer (for little or no consideration) to settlers—was unjust.  
And, in the end, they reasonably anticipated that the federal govern-
ment would choose to legalize their occupation, in much the same 
way that families welcome the stability introduced when a courtship 
turns to marriage.  Better property in-laws than outlaws. 
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A similar story can be told about the practice of “titling” informal 
property rights in the developing world.  Now a standard international 
development practice,
22
 titling was popularized by Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto in his 1989 book, The Other Path.  De Soto observed 
that in Lima, 42.6% of all housing was built on illegally acquired land 
at the time of his studies.
23
  He argued that squatters’ informal (i.e., 
illegal) status not only deprived them of access to capital, reduced 
productivity, and discouraged investment, but also forced them to rely 
on entirely extralegal mechanisms for protecting their entitlements 
and enforcing order.
24
  To the extent that the squatters’ situation, in 
Peru and throughout the developing world, results from a colonial-era 
land tenure system that favors a few large landowners, Peñalver and 
Katyal’s concern about an “ossified” property regime applies.
25
  But 
many squatting settlements are located on public lands; in other cases, 
the title is uncertain or disputed.
26
  In such cases, as Stewart Sterk 
helpfully illuminates in a forthcoming article, the costs of acquiring 
accurate information about the scope of property rights may them-
selves weigh in favor of an encroacher.  Sterk suggests that when such 
“search costs” are exceedingly high, liability-rule protection against 
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24
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25
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26
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encroachers may make more sense (from an efficiency standpoint).
27
  
And, interestingly, the example offered by Peñalver and Katyal of the 
forced transfer of rights to squatters in South Africa reflects just such a 
change—the court refused to evict the squatters, but also awarded the 
owner damages for the loss.
28
 
Consider, finally, Peñalver and Katyal’s example of “intersec-
tional” outlaws—squatters organized by civil rights groups during the 
early 1980s to occupy abandoned urban properties.  Peñalver and 
Katyal are correct that the campaigns had both acquisitive and expres-
sive elements.  But, tellingly, a central thrust of the squatters’ message 
was opposition to the inherent instability of the existing property re-
gime.
29
  Decades of urban disinvestment had left our cities riddled 
with vacant, decaying, buildings; many of them had become the locus 
of serious criminality.  Local governments owned many of these build-
ings as a result of tax delinquency and, even before the organized 
squatting campaigns, took (initially unsuccessful) steps to establish 
urban homesteading programs.  The urban squatters, responding to 
the same signals and incentives as their western forbearers, sought to 
position themselves as likely owners when the government ultimately 
acted to stabilize the existing property regime.
30
 
Peñalver and Katyal’s belief that acquisitive outlaws destabilize set-
tled property rules, rather than respond to unsettled ones, leads them 
to overstate the value (and understate the costs) of their disruptive ac-
tions.  Throughout the article, they suggest that property outlaws are 
important in part because those excluded by economic circumstance 
from market transactions have little recourse other than lawbreaking 
to signal how much they value a commodity.
31
  The difficulty is that, 
absent the uncertainty present in all three of Peñalver and Katyal’s ex-
 
27
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28
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29
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ies.”). 
30
See id. 
31
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amples of outlaw campaigns,
32
 the costs of forcibly redistributing 
property from attentive owners to desirous claimants will almost always 
outweigh the benefits.  Property rules evolve slowly for good reasons.  
Stable property rules provide important information, both to owners 
and to those who wish to transact with them.  Instability, among other 
things, impedes market transactions and discourages owners from in-
vesting and improving in their property.
33
  As Henry Smith and Tho-
mas Merrill have observed, the need for stability is highest for dimen-
sions of property rights that are invisible; the tangible attributes of 
property—i.e., the metes and bounds of a parcel—are relatively easy 
to ascertain, and there is less of a need to be concerned about third-
party information costs.
34
  Thus, Peñalver and Katyal may be correct 
that, on a very cold night, a homeless man will place extremely high 
value on the right to obtain shelter in a shopping mall.
35
  And, for rea-
sons helpfully illuminated by Lee Anne Fennell in a recent article, 
they also are correct that an acquisitive outlaw’s state of mind does 
send important signals about how much he values the property he 
seeks to acquire.
36
  Even assuming, however, that on cold nights a 
homeless man values access to the mall more than the developer who 
owns it values her right to exclude him, granting the homeless man a 
right of access would generate a host of difficulties.  Outsiders would 
not know which homeless people own cold-night easements, to which 
malls, and under what circumstances; insiders (e.g., mall developers 
and their financiers) would worry that future encumbrances would 
devalue mall property, etc. 
 None of this is intended to discount the seriousness of the 
homeless man’s plight; rather, I simply want to contrast the likely de-
stabilizing effects of ameliorating the situation through the forcible 
transfer of property rights with the stabilizing effects of, for example, 
titling efforts in the developing world.  Of course, the story might be 
different if the homeless man had been living in the mall since it was 
 
32
See id. at 1105-28 (discussing the squatters of the old American West, the lunch 
counter sit-ins of the Civil Rights Movement, as well as the urban squatters of the twen-
tieth century). 
33
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-42 (2000) (arguing that 
standardization of property rights is critical to limiting external costs for market par-
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34
Id. at 34. 
35
Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 10, at 1146. 
36
See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass:  The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1065-76 (2006) (arguing, on efficiency grounds, that adverse 
possession should be limited to intentional trespassers). 
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abandoned—or seized by the government for nonpayment of prop-
erty taxes—fifteen years ago.  But these destabilizing factors are what 
make Peñalver and Katyal’s celebration of acquisitive outlaws too easy.  
In each of their examples, a government granted title (usually to pub-
licly held property) to small landholders—including, but not limited 
to squatters—believing that the transfer would stabilize an unstable 
property regime.  As it turns out, this calculus was not always correct, 
but not because the land grants were themselves destabilizing.  As Mi-
chael Heller has noted, many nineteenth-century homesteaders’ plots 
were too small to be economically viable as farms and, because the law 
required them to occupy the property for a period of years to perfect 
title, “people either stayed and starved or abandoned the land.”
37
  
Similar problems have arisen with titling efforts; many newly minted 
owners find their tiny plots unmarketable and unworthy of credit 
from mainstream sources.
38
  The fact that urban homesteading has 
failed to generate the hoped-for stability in city neighborhoods can be 
blamed on analogous factors, or perhaps also on the circumstances 
that made abandoned urban buildings essentially unmarketable in the 
first place, including a high tax burden and property regulations that 
dramatically increase the cost of renovation.
39
 
I have less to say about Peñalver and Katyal’s treatment of “expres-
sive outlaws,” which, at its core, presents an expansive theory of con-
scientious objection that I am ill qualified to evaluate.  But I do offer a 
word of caution about their conviction that trespass is a “safe” form of 
conscientious objection because property crimes are relatively harm-
less.
40
  Peñalver and Katyal are right, of course, that trespass is a “mi-
nor” crime, at least in terms of penalty.  And they provide a com-
mendable example of peaceful expressive property lawbreaking—
lunch counter sit-ins during the early 1960s.
41
  But, their broad gener-
 
37
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38
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Worked, SLATE, Jan. 29, 2005, http://slate.com/id/2112792 (arguing that in some cases 
banks simply are not interested in securing loans with poor housing; in others, the 
poor are pushed out by the wealthy when the titles actually become valu able). 
39
See generally STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS:  
CONFRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE 73-75, 90 (1978) (outlining the market effects 
of building regulations). 
40
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 10, at 1135-36 (noting the “hierarchy of values” 
that places “bodily injury over harm to property”). 
41
Id. at 1114-22. 
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alization about the “harmlessness” of trespass as a means of expression 
suffers from two related flaws.  First, not all property outlaws are 
peaceful.  It is just as easy—perhaps more so—to conjure up examples 
of property outlaws engaging in violent expressive conduct.  During 
the sit-in era, for example, other property outlaws expressed their 
opinions by blowing up the homes of civil rights workers.  More recent 
examples abound:  animal rights activists vandalize testing laborato-
ries;
42
 eco-terrorists torch new suburban developments;
43
 abortion op-
ponents bomb clinics.
44
  While I am sure that Peñalver and Katyal 
condemn all of these activities, each highlights the possibility that 
property outlaws can be just as prone to violence (perhaps more so) 
than individuals engaged in other forms of conscientious objection. 
My second difficulty with Peñalver and Katyal’s characterization of 
trespass as relatively harmless is that it conflicts with their first justifica-
tion for celebrating property outlaws—namely, the fact that property 
matters to people.
45
  This conflict has serious, real-world, conse-
quences.  It may be the case that most trespasses are relatively minor 
offenses, settled without legal recourse; the same can be said of most 
family disputes.  But, all the same, many of the most emotional (and 
violent) interpersonal disputes occur among family members, and, 
most wars are fought over territory.  Property does matter, as centuries 
of battles, large and small, to defend it show.  Consider, for example, 
the recent actions of a group of “intersectional outlaws”—Jewish set-
tlers in the Gaza strip and the West Bank.  In 2005, the Israeli gov-
ernment forcibly relocated over 9,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and 
select areas of the West Bank.  Many of those settlers had lived in 
those places since moving there shortly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War, in part to make a statement that Jews are entitled to occupy all 
land within the borders of ancient Israel.  The settlers violently re-
sisted the government’s relocation efforts, pelting soldiers with rocks, 
bottles, and even pots of hot cooking oil.  For weeks, the world 
watched as soldiers dragged women and children, kicking and scream-
 
42
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POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 22, 1999, at B1. 
43
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talism and the “War on Terror,” 33 POL. & SOC’Y 425, 426 (2005) (summarizing activities 
of the Earth Liberation Front). 
44
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45
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ing, away from their homes.
46
  This summer, the Israeli authorities re-
turned to remove groups of settlers who had “reclaimed” their prop-
erty by barricading themselves into abandoned buildings.  All told, at 
least twenty illegal settlements have sprung up since 2001.  And Israel 
has promised to dismantle them, in an effort to diffuse the tension 
generated by the settlers’ presence and to prevent violent retribution 
by radical Palestinians who also claim the right to occupy the disputed 
territory.
47
 
In the end, I agree with much of what Peñalver and Katyal have to 
say about property outlaws:  they do send important signals, both in-
tentionally and as a byproduct of their selfish acquisitive actions.  And, 
they sometimes force an efficient redistribution of resources.  But I 
worry that their analysis proceeds from at least two incorrect assump-
tions about the special significance of property lawbreaking, namely 
that acquisitive outlaws are a destabilizing force and that trespass is a 
relatively harmless form of conscientious objection.  When these as-
sumptions are stripped away, their celebration of property outlaws 
loses some of its dramatic force. 
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